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THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS WITH THE ELECTION OF 
AMTRAK’S PRESIDENT 
Aaron Kahen* 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2015, the Supreme Court determined that Amtrak—the corporation 
created by federal statute and authorized to preserve passenger rail service—
is a governmental entity for separation of powers purposes.1  In his 
concurrence, Justice Alito wrote that while Amtrak should be considered a 
governmental entity, it did not necessarily follow that Amtrak’s corporate 
structure was constitutionally sufficient.2  He had a particular problem with 
the President of Amtrak and the way he was elected.3 
At the time the opinion was written, Amtrak’s board consisted of nine 
members.4  Eight of these members, including the Secretary of 
Transportation, were appointed by the President of the United States and 
confirmed by the Senate.5  Those eight members, in turn, elected the 
President of Amtrak as the ninth member of the board.6  The President of 
Amtrak had voting power, just like the rest of the board, and was able to sway 
decisions one way or another.7  Justice Alito took issue with this provision.  If 
Amtrak is a federal entity and the President of Amtrak has sway over the 
board’s decisions, Justice Alito reasoned, he should be considered a principal 
officer of the United States and should be appointed by the President of the 
 
* Comments Editor, University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law, Volume 21. University of 
Pennsylvania Law School, J.D., 2019; Tufts University, B.A., 2015.  Thank you to Professor Ryan 
Doerfler for spurring an interest in this area of law and guiding me through writing this Comment.  
Thank you as well to everyone on the Volume 21 team at the Journal of Constitutional Law for their 
help during the past year and especially the editing process.  Most importantly, thank you to my 
parents for supporting me throughout my academic career. 
 1 Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1233 (2015). 
 2 Id. at 1240 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 3 Id. at 1239. 
 4 See 49 U.S.C. § 24302(a)(1) (2008) (amended 2012); Dep’t of Transp., 135 S. Ct. at 1231. 
 5 See 49 U.S.C. § 24302(a)(1); Dep’t of Transp., 135 S. Ct. at 1231. 
 6 See 49 U.S.C. § 24302(a)(1)(B); 49 U.S.C. § 24303(a); Dep’t of Transp., 135 S. Ct. at 1231. 
 7 See Dep’t of Transp., 135 S. Ct. at 1239 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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United States and confirmed by the Senate.8 
Since the Court’s decision, Congress passed the Fixing America’s Surface 
Transportation (“FAST”) Act in December 2015.9  The FAST Act, inter alia, 
slightly modified Amtrak’s board structure.  Specifically, it made the 
President of Amtrak a nonvoting board member, and added an another, 
Amtrak-specific board member to be appointed by the President and 
confirmed by the Senate.  This brought the total number of board members 
to ten while retaining the same number of voting members.10  The FAST Act 
was a massive piece of legislation that covered a wide range of issues, and 
there is no indication in the legislative history that Congress changed the 
board composition in response to Justice Alito’s concerns.  However, by 
taking the President’s voting power out of play, Congress had removed a 
significant roadblock in determining whether the President of Amtrak is 
constitutionally elected. 
This does not mean, however, that Amtrak’s board structure is now 
constitutional.  To answer this question, this Comment proceeds in three 
Parts. First, it confirms that Amtrak is in fact a regulatory body that is 
subjected to the Appointments Clause.  Second, it determines that while the 
President of Amtrak wields enough authority to be considered an officer of 
the United States, he is subordinate to the rest of the board and should be 
considered an inferior officer of the United States.  Third, this Comment 
ascertains that Amtrak is a “Department” whose “Head” may appoint 
inferior officers because it is independent from other government agencies. 
Ultimately, I will make the argument that Congress’s actions in the FAST 
Act fixed the constitutional problems with Amtrak’s board, rendering Justice 
Alito’s concerns moot. 
I.  AMTRAK’S RELATIONSHIP TO THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
Amtrak is a unique corporation that was conceived as a private service 
with public support.  The Supreme Court has twice heard cases relating to 
Amtrak’s status as a governmental entity, holding that for both constitutional 
rights and separation of powers purposes, Amtrak should be considered part 
of the federal government.  The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has 
further held that Amtrak possesses regulatory power.  Thus, Amtrak is 
required to follow the constraints of the Appointments Clause. 
 
 8 Id. 
 9 Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 114-94, § 11205, 129 Stat. 1312, 1637 
(2015). 
 10 Id.; 49 U.S.C. § 24302(a)(1)(C). 
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A.  Creation and Statutory Status of Amtrak 
In 1970, President Richard Nixon signed into law the Rail Passenger 
Service Act of 1970 (“RPSA”), which created the National Railroad 
Passenger Corporation, popularly known as Amtrak.11  Amtrak was formed 
in response to the decline in passenger ridership in order to preserve intercity 
passenger train service.12  Although Amtrak was originally conceived as a for-
profit corporation, Congress later amended the relevant statute to read that 
Amtrak should be “managed as a for-profit corporation.”13  Importantly, 
Congress explicitly states that Amtrak is not a “department, agency, or 
instrumentality of the [United States] Government.”14 
Congress’s disavowal of an agency relationship between the United 
States Government and Amtrak has significant implications.  For example, 
Congress has the authority to remove regulatory agencies from the 
constraints of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).15  Regardless of 
Amtrak’s posture as a federal agency, there is no question that it would be 
exempt from the APA and its requirements.16  Congress, through this 
pronouncement, has also deprived Amtrak of sovereign immunity typically 
afforded to the federal government17 and of the power to pledge the credit of 
the United States on its debt obligations.18 
However, Congress cannot override the Constitution.  By simply labeling 
Amtrak a corporation and by disclaiming any agency relationship, Congress 
does not relieve Amtrak of its constitutional obligations if it is, in fact, an 
agent of the government.19  In two cases, the Supreme Court held that 
 
 11 Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-518, § 301, 84 Stat. 1327, 1330. 
 12 Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 383–84 (1995). 
 13 49 U.S.C. § 24301(a)(2) (emphasis added); Lebron, 513 U.S. at 384–85 (emphasis added). 
 14 49 U.S.C. § 24301(a)(3). 
 15 5 U.S.C. § 559 (2012); see, e.g., Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 308–09 (1955) (holding that 
because the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 included procedures distinct from those 
required by the APA, Congress acted to exempt the deportation process from the APA’s 
requirements). 
 16 See Lebron, 513 U.S. at 392. 
 17 Id.; see, e.g., Sentner v. Amtrak, 540 F. Supp. 557, 557–58 (D.N.J. 1982) (demonstrating that Amtrak 
can be sued for damages). 
 18 Lebron, 513 U.S. at 392. 
 19 See Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1231 (2015) (“Congressional 
pronouncements, though instructive as to matters within Congress’s authority to address are not 
dispositive of Amtrak’s status as a governmental entity for purposes of separation of powers analysis 
under the Constitution.” (internal citation omitted) (citing United States ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier 
Corp., 380 F.3d 488, 491 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Roberts, J.)); Lebron, 513 U.S. at 397 (“On that thesis, 
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) can be resurrected by the simple device of having the State 
of Louisiana operate segregated trains through a state-owned Amtrak.”). 
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Amtrak was a government actor based on this principle.20 
B.  Amtrak’s Status as a Governmental Entity 
In Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., the Court determined that 
Amtrak is an “agency or instrumentality of the United States for the purpose 
of individual rights guaranteed against the Government by the 
Constitution.”21  In that case, the petitioner wanted to display a political 
advertisement on the billboard leading into the entrance of Amtrak’s 
Pennsylvania Station in New York City.22  Amtrak disapproved of the 
advertisement based on its political nature and refused to display it.23  The 
petitioner proceeded to file suit, alleging that Amtrak, acting as a government 
actor, violated his First Amendment rights.24 
The Court viewed two factors as pertinent when designating Amtrak as 
a government actor.  First, Amtrak was created “explicitly for the furtherance 
of federal governmental goals.”25  Second, the government controls the 
board of Amtrak through appointment by the President.26  Amtrak was thus 
essentially the same as “so called independent regulatory agencies” because 
the government could control Amtrak to do its specific federal governmental 
goals.27  The Court had spoken: Amtrak was the federal government for 
purposes of individual constitutional rights. 
Twenty years later, the Court took a step further in deciding that Amtrak 
is a governmental entity for separation of powers purposes in Department of 
Transportation v. Ass’n of American Railroads.28  The issue in that case concerned 
the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act (“PRIIA”), which 
directed the Federal Railroad Administration (“FRA”) and Amtrak to jointly 
create “metrics and standards” of measuring “performance and service 
 
 20 See Dep’t of Transp., 135 S. Ct. at 1232–33; Lebron, 513 U.S. at 397. 
 21 Lebron, 513 U.S. at 394. 
 22 Id. at 376. 
 23 Id. at 377. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. at 397. 
 26 Id. at 397–98.  At the time the case was written, Congress had imposed more restrictions over whom 
the President could appoint than exist currently.  However, the Court found these to be 
“restriction[s] imposed by one of the political branches upon the other” rather than “an absence of 
control by the Government.”  Id. 
 27 See id. at 398 (referring. to the Federal Communications Commission and the Securities Exchange 
Commission as agencies which are “so-called independent” but under the “direction and control” 
of the federal government). 
 28 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1232–33 (2015). 
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quality of intercity passenger train operations.”29  The metrics and standards 
were used, among other things, to determine whether delays to Amtrak’s 
scheduled ridership were caused in part by host railroads’ freight 
transportation.30  If the Surface Transportation Board (“STB”) determined 
this to be the case, it could award Amtrak damages from those host rail 
carriers.31  The Association of American Railroads (“AAR”), the freight 
railroad industry group, sued the Department of Transportation and 
Amtrak, alleging that PRIIA was unconstitutional based on the violations of 
the nondelegation doctrine and on Fifth Amendment due process grounds.32  
Specifically, AAR alleged that the separation of powers doctrine was violated 
“by placing legislative and rulemaking authority in the hands of a private 
entity . . . that participates in the very industry it is supposed to regulate.”33  
More still, AAR insisted it had not received due process because “the 
coercive power of the government” had been placed in the hands of an 
interested private party.34  Like Amtrak itself had done in Lebron, AAR 
contended that Amtrak could not have been a government actor because of 
Congress’s specificity that it “is not a department, agency, or instrumentality 
of the United States Government.”35 
The district court granted summary judgment to Amtrak, holding that 
the political branches “exercise[ ] sufficient control over promulgation and 
enforcement of the metrics and standards,” so the relevant part of PRIIA was 
constitutional.36  AAR appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit reversed the district court, holding that Amtrak is a 
“private corporation with respect to Congress’s power to 
delegate . . . authority,” so Amtrak cannot be constitutionally granted “the 
regulatory power prescribed in [PRIIA].”37 
The Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit, holding that for 
separation of powers purposes, Amtrak was a governmental entity.38  The 
Court used similar factors when designating Amtrak a governmental entity 
as it did in Lebron.  It noted that the government created and controlled 
 
 29 Id. at 1229. 
 30 Id. at 1230. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 35 Id. at 1233 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 36 Id. at 1230; see also Ass’n of Am. R.Rs. v. Dep’t of Transp., 865 F. Supp. 2d 22, 29 (D.D.C. 2012). 
 37 Ass’n of Am. R.Rs. v. Dep’t of Transp., 721 F.3d 666, 677 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 38 Dep’t of Transp., 135 S. Ct. at 1233. 
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Amtrak and “specif[ied] many of its day-to-day operations.”39  Further, the 
government subsidizes Amtrak, sets its policy goals, and demands 
accountability and transparency.40  Justice Alito’s concurrence suggested that 
Amtrak held regulatory power, a point confirmed by Judge Brown on 
remand.41  Judge Brown continued that since the metrics and standards that 
Amtrak helped create needed to be incorporated into the operating 
agreements of freight rail carriers “to the extent practicable,” Amtrak was 
exerting regulatory power over private actors.42  Noncompliance may put 
the carriers at “heightened risk of disadvantageous terms or rates,” which 
encourage railroads to obey, signifying regulatory power.43 
As far as the courts have spoken, Amtrak has regulatory power, should 
be treated as a regulatory body, and is a governmental entity for separation 
of powers purposes.44  As a part of the federal government, Congress did not 
err in delegating regulatory authority to Amtrak.  Amtrak is thus subject to 
the Appointments Clause of the Constitution because of its ability to perform 
executive functions.45 
 
 39 Id. at 1234 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 40 Id. at 1233. 
 41 Id. at 1236 (Alito, J., concurring) (“Because obedience to the metrics and standards materially 
reduces the risk of liability, railroads face powerful incentives to obey.  That is regulatory power.”); 
Ass’n of Am. R.Rs. v. Dep’t of Transp., 821 F.3d 19, 33–34 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
 42 Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 821 F.3d at 33 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 43 Id. 
 44 On remand, the D.C. Circuit determined that Congress had violated the Fifth Amendment Due 
Process Clause by allowing “an entity to make law when, economically speaking, it has skin in the 
game.”  Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 821 F.3d at 23.  The court reasoned that even with its “governmental 
entity” status, Amtrak was a “self-interested entity” that holds “regulatory authority over its 
competitors.”  Id. at 31–34.  Judge Brown, writing for the court, held that Amtrak was a self-
interested entity despite the Supreme Court’s designation that Amtrak was “not an autonomous 
private enterprise.”  Id. at 32 (citing Dep’t of Transp., 135 S. Ct. at 1232).  Amtrak’s statutory mandate 
to be operated and managed as a for-profit corporation, to interact with the private sector, and to 
minimize the need for government subsidies all contributed to the indication that Amtrak is a self-
interested entity.  Id.  Further, Congress provided Amtrak with incentives to maximize profits by 
allowing their officers to be paid higher than market rate if the organization did not receive federal 
subsidies.  Id.; see also 49 U.S.C. § 24303(b) (2012).  There are arguments to be made that Amtrak 
is not a self-interested entity because its statutory command to act “as a for-profit corporation” is 
nothing more than a mandate to run efficiently within the government, but it does not affect the 
following analysis.  The significant portion of the court’s opinion is that Congress is able to give 
Amtrak regulatory power in some capacity, subjecting it to the Appointments Clause. 
 45 Dep’t of Transp., 135 S. Ct. at 1239 (“[A]ccountability demands that principal officers be appointed 
by the President.  The President, after all, must have ‘the general administrative control of those 
executing the laws,’ and this principle applies with special force to those who can ‘[e]xercise 
significant authority’ without direct supervision.” (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted) 
(citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; then quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 164 (1926); 
and then quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976)). 
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II.  PRINCIPAL OFFICERS, INFERIOR OFFICERS, AND GOVERNMENT 
EMPLOYEES 
Now that the Supreme Court has determined Amtrak to be a 
governmental entity with regulatory power for separation of powers 
purposes, the next step in determining the constitutionality of Amtrak’s 
structure is determining the status of Amtrak’s board members, particularly 
its President. 
The Appointments Clause of the Constitution gives the President of the 
United States the power to appoint officers of the United States with the 
advice and consent of the Senate.46  This power extends to what we now call 
principal officers, distinguished from what the Constitution calls “inferior 
Officers.”47  Inferior officers can be appointed, with congressional 
authorization, by the President alone, Courts of Law, or Heads of 
Departments.48 
While the Appointments Clause discusses principal and inferior officers, 
it is not true that all federal workers fall into one of those two categories.49 
Workers who are not officers, therefore, must fall within a third category, one 
we will label “government employees.”  
When determining whether the President of Amtrak is constitutionally 
elected, one must consider what type of official he is.  If he is a principal 
officer, he is surely unconstitutionally elected, since he would need to be 
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.  If he is an inferior 
officer, he may be unconstitutionally elected, depending on whether Amtrak 
as an agency is considered a “Department” and its board members are 
considered its “Head.”50  If he is a mere government employee, then there is 
no problem with his election, since the Constitution imposes no obligations 
on appointing (or hiring) government employees. 
This Article makes the argument that the President of Amtrak is an 
inferior officer because while he holds significant authority, he is subordinate 
to and subject to the control of principal officers. 
 
 46 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
 49 See generally Jennifer L. Mascott, Who Are “Officers of the United States”?, 70 STAN. L. REV. 443, 452 
(2018) (analyzing the dividing line between inferior officers and “lower-level, non-Article II officials 
known as employees”). 
 50 See infra Part III. 
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A.  Officers Versus Government Employees 
The President of Amtrak cannot be considered a mere government 
employee because he clearly has some discretion in his decision-making and 
performs his duties with “significant authority.” 
1.  The Law 
Besides the phrase “established by Law,” the Constitution does not 
clearly speak to what constitutes an officer versus an employee.51  This 
distinction may have large implications.  For example, as of 2017, the 
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) alone had over 15,000 
employees,52 and no one would contend that each of them needed to be 
appointed by the Administrator of the EPA.  To hold otherwise would have 
huge ramifications for the entire administrative state, requiring everyone 
from office administrators to aides to custodial workers to be hired by the 
head of whatever department they are tied to.  So, the question persists: how 
important must a government worker be to be considered at least an inferior 
officer?  What would their duties look like?  To answer these questions, we 
can turn to three sources: Framers’ intent, case law, and policy.53 
Framers’ intent does not help too much in answering the question 
because the Framers did not seem concerned with the question of who would 
be an officer, only with who would be able to appoint those officers.54  
However, the Court in Buckley v. Valeo opined that in describing the “Officers 
of the United States, . . . the drafters had a less frivolous purpose in mind” 
than mere “etiquette or protocol” and believed the term was “intended to 
have substantive meaning.”55 
With that alleged intent in mind, the Court held that a person who 
“exercis[es] significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States” 
is an officer.56  Labeling “significant authority” as the deciding factor for an 
officer ruled out the circular argument used previously that officers are 
officers because they are appointed.57  However, this distinction did not make 
 
 51 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 52 EPA’s Budget and Spending, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/planandbudget/budget (last visited Jan. 11, 
2019).  
 53 For a greater discussion on many factors that help define the difference between “officer” and 
“employee,” see generally Edward Susolik, Note, Separation of Powers and Liberty: The Appointments 
Clause, Morrison v. Olson, and Rule of Law, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1515, 1543–46 (1990). 
 54 Id. at 1544. 
 55 424 U.S. 1, 125–26 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted); Susolik, supra note 53, at 1544–45. 
 56 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126. 
 57 See, e.g., Burnap v. United States, 252 U.S. 512, 516 (1920) (“Whether the incumbent is an officer 
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answering the question significantly easier because it did little work in 
defining what counted as “significant authority.”58  The only examples of this 
authority it provided were “rulemaking, [and writing] advisory opinions.”59 
Fifteen years later, the Court in Freytag v. Commissioner determined that 
Special Trial Judges (“STJs”) were officers rather than mere employees 
because they performed “more than ministerial tasks” such as taking 
testimony, conducting trials, ruling on the admissibility of evidence, and 
enforcing compliance with discovery orders.60  The Court emphasized that 
the duties required the “exercise [of] significant discretion,”61 a point relied 
on in a 2000 D.C. Circuit case, Landry v. FDIC, which held that “final 
decisionmaking power” was critical to the officer-employee distinction.62  
The Supreme Court’s most recent writing on this question came in Lucia v. 
SEC.63  The case asked whether Administrative Law Judges (“ALJs”) of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC” or the “Commission”) should 
be considered officers or not.  Comparing ALJs to Freytag’s STJs, the Court 
ruled that ALJs were officers because their position was created by statute 
and because their authority was significant.64  As in Freytag, Justice Kagan 
cited their ability to “[r]eceiv[e] evidence[,]” “[e]xamine witnesses[,]” and 
“conduct trials.”65 
The undeveloped test outlined by the courts can be further clarified by 
looking at the policy goals of the Appointments Clause.  The Appointments 
Clause provides accountability and transparency to the public.  Mandating 
that officers are appointed by individuals ensures that the people know who 
appointed them and can hold the individual accountable if the officers make 
poor decisions.66  If accountability is a goal, then the officers must be doing 
 
or an employee is determined by the manner in which Congress has specifically provided for the 
creation of the several positions, their duties and appointment thereto.”); United States v. 
Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 509–10 (1878); see also Stacy M. Lindstedt, Developing the Duffy Defect: 
Identifying Which Government Workers are Constitutionally Required to Be Appointed, 76 MO. L. REV. 1143, 
1151 (2011) (“Several early Appointments Clause cases took cursory looks at the officer-employee 
distinction, sometimes relying entirely on whether the person had been appointed to determine if a 
person was an officer.”). 
 58 See Susolik, supra note 53, at 1545. 
 59 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 140. 
 60 501 U.S. 868, 881–82 (1991). 
 61 Id. at 882. 
 62 204 F.3d 1125, 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 63 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018). 
 64 Id. at 2053 (finding that ALJs conduct similar vital functions as STJs). 
 65 Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 66 See E. Garrett West, Clarifying the Employee-Officer Distinction in Appointments Clause Jurisprudence, 127 
YALE L.J. FORUM 42, 55 (2017) (“The President, then, always depends on Congress to provide for 
the appointment of his officers, and the public will know that he (or the ‘Heads of Department’ or 
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something important enough that accountability matters.67  This would 
suggest that finality in decision-making is important as well as the power to 
compel action.68 
Thus, it is still unclear exactly what “significant authority” entails.  The 
best understanding we have involves some sort of discretionary power that 
includes more than simple ministerial tasks.  In accordance with the goals of 
the Appointments Clause, the power should be significant enough that the 
individual’s appointers should be held accountable for poor decisions. 
2.  The President of Amtrak is Not a Government Employee 
The President of Amtrak must be considered an officer and not a mere 
government employee because he acts as the leader of Amtrak and is able to 
make important decisions regarding how to run the corporation. 
Statutorily, the President of Amtrak only has one specified duty: to 
designate a panel of members that reviews maintenance and rehabilitation 
plans.69  However, to say that this is his only role would be a 
mischaracterization of what he actually does.  Nor do his statutorily defined 
duties designate him as an officer or not.  We would otherwise fall into the 
same circular trap of defining an officer as someone who Congress says is an 
officer.  This would allow Congress to circumvent the Constitution’s 
separation of powers doctrine by failing to list the duties of personnel who 
are in practice principal or inferior officers, but who were not appointed 
according to the Constitution. 
The President of Amtrak is the administrative leader of the railroad.70  In 
an interview with National Public Radio (“NPR”), the current President of 
Amtrak, Richard H. Anderson, acknowledged that his duties comprised 
mostly of “day-to-day management[,] and persuading the government to do 
more to continue support of the system.”71  He serves as the public face of 
 
the ‘Courts of Law’) is to blame when those officers fail in their duties.”). 
 67 Some scholars disagree, maintaining that the original meaning of “officers” is much broader than 
that.  See, e.g., Mascott, supra note 49, at 454 (arguing that the proper test for determining who an 
officer is to ask if he is “one whom the government entrusts with ongoing responsibility to perform 
a statutory duty of any level of importance”). 
 68 See West, supra note 66, at 44 (proposing a test to determine who officers are by asking whether they 
have the ability to “alter legal rights and obligations on behalf of the United States”) 
 69 49 U.S.C. § 24305(b)(1) (2008) (amended (2012)) (assigning the President of Amtrak the power to 
select members of the review panel). 
 70 Amtrak President Joseph Boardman, 2000s., AMTRAK, https://history.amtrak.com/archives/amtrak-
president-joseph-boardman-2000s (last visited Jan. 11, 2019) (expounding on initiatives lead by the 
ninth president of Amtrak). 
 71 New CEO Richard Anderson Outlines His Vision for Amtrak, NPR: ALL THINGS CONSIDERED (Sept. 5, 
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the corporation by outlining his vision for the future of Amtrak72 and by 
responding to major accidents.73  The President of Amtrak also serves as the 
representative of the corporation to Congress, and is “summoned to 
hearings” to answer questions about Amtrak’s funding problems.74 
A look at the bylaws of Amtrak shines more light on his responsibilities 
and powers.  The President is able to call special meetings of shareholders or 
board members.75  He is to be consulted and asked for a recommendation if 
the board wishes to remove any other officers.76  By default, the President is 
the Chief Executive Officer of Amtrak, a title that carries numerous 
responsibilities, including “general supervision of the affairs of the 
Corporation” and the supervision of all employees and officers.77  The 
President also has the power to approve and execute indemnification 
agreements with third parties.78 
Lastly, the President of Amtrak sits on the board of directors for Amtrak 
with the other nine members as a nonvoting member.79  Although he cannot 
vote to make significant decisions, his inclusion on the board indicates that 
he holds some significance and may contribute to ideas discussed at board 
meetings. 
From these responsibilities, there is every indication that the President of 
Amtrak has “significant authority” as used in the legal sense.  As the head 
and face of the organization, he decides what to focus on and how to respond 
 
2017, 4:29 PM) https://www.npr.org/2017/09/05/548715358/new-ceo-richard-anderson-
outlines-his-vision-for-amtrak. 
 72 Amtrak’s CEO Shares His Vision for Rail’s Future, CBS NEWS (Sept. 5, 2017, 12:44 PM), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/amtrak-ceo-outlines-vision-for-rail-system (discussing initiatives 
to improve Amtrak such as increasing train speeds and providing more options for nonstop service). 
 73 Mark Matousek, Amtrak CEO Responds to Deadly Accident: ‘We Are Deeply Saddened by All That Has 
Happened Today,’ BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 18, 2017, 5:58 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/ 
amtrak-ceo-responds-to-deadly-accident-2017-12 (noting that one role of the President of Amtrak 
is expressing condolences after rail accidents). 
 74 Ashley Halsey III, Amtrak President Joseph Boardman Says He Plans to Step Down Next Year, WASH. POST 
(Dec. 11, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/federal-eye/wp/2015/12/11/amtrak-
president-joseph-boardman-says-he-plans-to-step-down-next-year/?utm_term=.22d33908dee8. 
 75 NAT’L R.R. PASSENGER CORP., AMENDED & RESTATED BYLAWS § 3.03 (2016) (on file with 
author) (describing the procedure for calling a special meeting of the shareholders). 
 76 Id. § 6.03 (describing the procedure for officer removal by the Amtrak board). 
 77 Id. § 6.06; see also Amtrak Names Former Delta Executive Richard Anderson as New CEO, FORTUNE (June 
26, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/06/26/amtrak-richard-anderson-ceo/.  While the President 
and CEO are often the same person, this is not necessarily always the case.  For example, when the 
current President of Amtrak was named, the previous President and CEO decided to be co-CEOs 
with the new President for approximately six months.  Id. 
 78 NAT’L R.R. PASSENGER CORP., supra note 75, § 9.01(d)(2); see also id. § 9.03 (assigning the execution 
of indemnification agreements to the President or General Counsel of Amtrak). 
 79 49 U.S.C. § 24302 (2008) (amended (2012)). 
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to the public. His duties are not “mere ministerial tasks” but to lead the 
organization through challenges and to make major decisions of policy.  He 
is surely, therefore, an officer of the United States and must be appointed 
according to the Constitution. 
B.  Distinguishing Between Principal and Inferior Officers 
Since we can safely assume that the President of Amtrak is some sort of 
officer, the next step in this analysis is determining whether he is an inferior 
officer or principal officer.  This Article argues that the President of Amtrak 
should be considered an inferior officer because he is subordinate to and 
subject to control by the rest of the board, who are all principal officers. 
1.  The Law 
In Morrison v. Olsen, Chief Justice Rehnquist outlined a four-part balancing 
test that determined whether an officer is inferior or principal.80 The case 
centered around the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 and whether the 
Attorney General’s appointment of the Independent Counsel was 
constitutional.  The first part of the test determined whether the officer is “to 
some degree ‘inferior’ in rank and authority,” holding that an officer is inferior 
in this sense if they can be removed by a higher Executive Branch official who 
is not the President.81  The second part of the test regarded whether the officer 
had “certain, limited duties” or not.82  Duties are “limited” when the official 
performing them cannot set policy on behalf of the government or is restricted 
to working on assigned tasks.83  The third part of the test concerned the limited 
jurisdiction of the officer.84  Lastly, the shorter the duration of the officer’s 
tenure, the stronger the case the officer is inferior.85 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 80 487 U.S. 654, 670–73 (1988). 
 81 Id. at 671; see also id. at 672–73 (noting that the independent counsel was a “subordinate officer” 
because he could be removed by the Attorney General). 
 82 Id. at 671. 
 83 Id. at 671–72. 
 84 Id. at 672. 
 85 Id. 
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Justice Scalia wrote a widely celebrated86 dissent in Morrison that claimed 
the majority missed a necessary condition for defining an inferior officer: 
subordination.87  An officer can only be subordinate if he or she is “subject 
to supervision” and to some sort of control by a superior officer.88  Because 
the Independent Counsel could only be removed by the Attorney General 
“for cause,” Justice Scalia argued, there was not a sufficient level of 
superiority and control. 
Nine years after Morrison, Justice Scalia penned an opinion in Edmond v. 
United States that concerned whether judges of the Coast Guard Court of 
Criminal Appeals (“CGCCA”) were inferior or principal officers.89  The 
Court, while applying the Morrison test, focused on the first factor: whether 
the officers had a superior.90  Although the Court found that CGCCA judges 
had failed two of the factors (limited jurisdiction and tenure) and did not 
discuss limited duties, they still held them to be inferior officers.91  It is not 
clear that the Morrison test was applied as evenly as it had been nine years 
prior.92  Although Morrison was technically applied, there is good reason to 
believe its four-factor test had been practically overruled by Edmond.93  Thus, 
the most important factor when determining whether an officer is inferior or 
principal officer is whether the officer is subject to some sort of supervision 
and control by a principal officer. 
 
 86 Id. at 697–734 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see Terry Eastland, Scalia’s Finest Opinion, WKLY. STANDARD 
(Mar. 11, 2016, 12:40 AM), http://www.weeklystandard.com/scalias-finest-opinion/article/ 
2001510 (explaining Scalia’s dissent in Morrison and its popularity); Justice Kagan and Judges Srinivasan 
and Kethledge Offer Views from the Bench, STAN. L.  SCH. (May 30, 2015), https://law.stanford.edu/ 
stanford-lawyer/articles/justice-kagan-and-judges-srinivasan-and-kethledge-offer-views-from-the-
bench/ (describing an event at which Justice Elena Kagan described Justice Scalia’s lone dissent in 
Morrison as “one of the greatest dissents ever written and every year it gets better” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 87 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 719 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 88 Id. at 720–21 (discussing that inferior officers would “by chain of command still be under the direct 
control of the President”). 
 89 520 U.S. 651, 653, 660–61 (1997). 
 90 Id. at 663 (arguing that political accountability requires an officer’s work to be directly supervised 
by a person appointed by the President and approved by the Senate). 
 91 Id. at 661. 
 92 See id. at 667 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“It does not follow, 
however, that if one is subject to some supervision and control, one is an inferior 
officer.  Accordingly, in Morrison, the Court’s determination that the independent counsel was ‘to 
some degree inferior’ to the Attorney General did not end the enquiry.” (internal citations omitted) 
(citing Morrison, 487 U.S. at 671–72 (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
 93 See generally Nick Bravin, Note, Is Morrison v. Olson Still Good Law?  The Court’s New Appointments 
Clause Jurisprudence, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1103 (1998) (arguing that the balancing test applied in 
Morrison was supplanted by a bright-line rule put forth in Edmond hinging on whether the 
purportedly inferior officer has a superior). 
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2.  The President of Amtrak Should Be Considered an Inferior Officer 
The President of Amtrak should be considered an inferior officer because 
he is clearly subordinate to the board that appointed him.  Since he no longer 
has voting power, he is unable to affect decisions at the highest level and is 
only able to make management decisions.  Although the President of 
Amtrak’s power is significant, some entity other than the President of the 
United States—namely, the board of Amtrak—can replace him.  Therefore, 
the President of Amtrak is subordinate to the board, whose members are 
principal officers of the United States. 
In his concurrence in Department of Transportation v. Association of American 
Railroads, Justice Alito lays out his argument for why the President of Amtrak 
is a principal officer in the following manner: 1) multimember bodies may head 
an agency; 2) those who head agencies must be principal officers; and 3) every 
member of a multimember body heading an agency must be a principal 
officer, since every member of a multimember body could cast the deciding 
vote with respect to a particular decision.94  Although Justice Alito’s logic 
determines that casting a deciding vote with respect to a particular decision is 
a sufficient condition, not a necessary condition, it is safe to assume that this 
was his main issue with the board’s arrangement, considering this is the only 
point he raised.  Although the President of Amtrak sits on the board, the FAST 
Act removed his voting power.95  Thus, he is unable to “cast [a] deciding vote 
with respect to a particular decision,”96 mooting Justice Alito’s argument. 
Further, the modern test outlined by the Supreme Court supports the 
contention that the President of Amtrak is an inferior officer.  The President 
of Amtrak is an officer who “serve[s] at the pleasure of the board,” meaning 
that the board has authority to remove the officer at will.97  Since he is able 
to be removed by an entity that is not the President of the United States, the 
first and most important factor of Morrison, and the only significant factor in 
Edmond, is satisfied. 
Comparing the scope of the President of Amtrak’s duties to the scope of 
the duties assigned to the Independent Counsel in Morrison, we can conclude 
that they are similar in dimension.  The President of Amtrak is granted a 
wide range of duties that all pertain to a particular organization and mission, 
 
 94 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1239 (Alito, J., concurring) (explaining that, given that multimember bodies may 
head agencies, and those who head agencies must be principal officers, it follows that every member 
of a multimember body heading an agency must be a principal officer). 
 95 See Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 114-94, § 11205, 129 Stat. 1312, 
1637 (2015). 
 96 Dep’t of Transp., 135 S. Ct. at 1239 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 97 49 U.S.C. § 24303(a) (2008) (amended (2012)). 
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just as the Independent Counsel was granted duties for a specific goal in 
mind.  Both of their jurisdictions are similarly restricted to one organization 
or goal. 
Although the President of Amtrak does not have a limited tenure, his 
subordination to the board without any primary decision-making power in 
the form of a board vote renders him an inferior officer. 
III.  AMTRAK AS A DEPARTMENT 
In Department of Transportation v. Ass’n of American Railroads, Justice Alito 
argued that even if the government was correct in its assertion that the 
President of Amtrak was an inferior officer, that President still may be 
unconstitutionally elected.98  Inferior officers can only be appointed by the 
President of the United States alone, Courts of Law, or Heads of 
Departments.99  Justice Alito contended that it is not clear that Amtrak is a 
Department.  However, case law and policy both indicate that Amtrak is a 
Department and its multimember board is its Head for Appointment Clause 
purposes. 
A.  Defining a Department 
For Appointments Clause purposes, a “Department” does not have to be 
what is traditionally referred to as an “executive department.”  This issue was 
first tackled in Freytag v. Commissioner when the Court was confronted with the 
constitutionality of a United States Tax Court judge appointing STJs.100  
After establishing that the STJs were inferior officers, the Court set out to 
answer whether the tax court should (or could) be considered a “Court of 
Law” or “Head[ ] of Department[ ]” according to the Appointments 
Clause.101  After discussing the historical reasons for the Appointments 
Clause, the majority rejected the tax court as a “Department,” instead 
holding that “Head[ ] of Department[ ]” should be confined to “executive 
divisions like the Cabinet-level departments.”102  It reasoned that the 
Appointments Clause is primarily concerned with accountability and 
Cabinet members are readily identifiable and directly accountable to the 
President.103  The spirit of the Appointments Clause, the majority reasoned, 
 
 98 Dep’t of Transp., 135 S. Ct. at 1239 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 99  U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 100 501 U.S. 868, 870 (1991).  
 101 Id.. at 884, 886. 
 102 Id. at 887–88. 
 103 Id. at 886. 
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would be too diluted if the number of “actors eligible to appoint” were 
enlarged so much.104  While emphatically declaring that the tax court is “not 
a Departmen[t],”105 the Court, in a footnote, stated that it “[does] not 
address here any question involving an appointment of an inferior officer by 
the head of one of the principal agencies, such as . . . the Securities and 
Exchange Commission.”106  The majority ultimately held that the scheme 
was nevertheless constitutional because the Article I courts could be 
considered “Courts of Law” for Appointments Clause purposes.107 
A concurrence written by Justice Scalia and joined by three other 
members of the Court agreed that the STJs were inferior officers and that 
the Chief Judge of the tax court had the constitutional authority to appoint 
them, but as a Head of Department, not as a Court of Law.108  Heads of 
Departments include “the heads of all agencies immediately below the 
President in the organizational structure of the Executive Branch,” Justice 
Scalia said.109  The departments in the Appointments Clause are the same as 
the departments in the Opinions Clause, and surely the President is able to 
solicit opinions from principal officers in non-Cabinet departments, Justice 
Scalia reasoned.110 
The Court wrestled with the issue again in 2010 in Free Enterprise Fund v. 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”).111  In PCAOB, an 
accounting firm and the Free Enterprise Fund sued the titular PCAOB 
seeking declaratory judgment that the board was unconstitutional.112  The 
board was created as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 in response to 
several accounting scandals and its board members were appointed by the 
SEC.113  Among its other arguments, the Free Enterprise Fund argued that 
the SEC had no authority to appoint the board members because they were 
not a “Department,” further alleging that departments referred only to 
“Executive departments,” such as the State, Treasury, or Defense 
Departments.114  The majority, led by Chief Justice Roberts, was tasked with 
 
 104 Id. at 885. 
 105 Id. at 888 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 106 Id. at 887 n.4. 
 107 Id. at 890–91. 
 108 Id. at 901 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 109 Id. at 918.  
 110 Id. at 918–19. 
 111 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd. (PCAOB), 561 U.S. 477, 487 (2010).  
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. at 510 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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answering the issue left in the footnote in Freytag.115  Ultimately, the Court 
sided with Justice Scalia, who “would have concluded that the Commission 
is indeed such a ‘Department,’ because it is a ‘free-standing, self-contained 
entity in the Executive Branch.’”116  Chief Justice Roberts further adopted 
Justice Scalia’s historical precedent, in which Congress authorized the 
Postmaster General to appoint assistants and deputies—surely inferior 
officers—without being in the President’s Cabinet.117  Ultimately, because 
the SEC was a “freestanding component of the Executive Branch, not 
subordinate to or contained within any other such component,” it satisfied 
the requirements of “Department” for Appointments Clause purposes.118 
PCAOB offered the last word on what constitutes a Department.  A 
Department does not need to be one traditionally recognized as within the 
President’s Cabinet and should be a freestanding component of the 
Executive Branch, not subordinate to or within any other government 
agency. 
B.  Multimember Boards 
A Department may be composed of a multimember board and its 
members may collectively act as the Head of the Department to appoint 
inferior officers.119  In PCAOB, the Free Enterprise Fund alleged that: 
1) PCAOB members were principal officers and thus had to be appointed by 
the President with the advice and consent of the Senate; 2) even if PCAOB 
members were inferior officers, they were not constitutionally appointed 
because the SEC could not have properly been regarded as a Department in 
the constitutional sense; and 3) even if the SEC could be considered a 
Department, the several Commissioners of the Commission could not be 
considered its “Head.”120  The Court first concluded, under Edmond, that the 
board members were inferior officers.121  Next, the Court determined the 
 
 115 See id. (“In Freytag, we specifically reserved the question whether a ‘principal agency, such as . . . the 
Securities and Exchange Commission,’ is a ‘Department’ under the Appointments Clause.” 
(internal citations omitted); Freytag, 501 U.S. at 887 n.4. 
 116 PCAOB, 561 U.S. at 510–11 (internal citations omitted). 
 117 Id. at 511. 
 118  Id. 
 119 Id. at 511–12. 
 120 Id. at 487–88 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The Free Enterprise Fund made additional 
arguments, some of which succeeded, unlike its Appointment Clause arguments.  Ultimately, the 
Court held that two layers of “for cause” removal (one for the SEC and one for the PCAOB), 
subverted the Executive’s ability to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.  Id. at 498. 
 121 PCAOB, 561 U.S. at 510. 
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SEC is a “Department.”122  Lastly, the Court saw no reason “why a 
multimember body may not be the ‘Head’ of a ‘Department.’”123  The Court 
found support for this proposition in earlier statutory practice, case law, and 
constitutional interpretation.124  Specifically, the Court held that the 
Appointments Clause permits collective appointments by the Courts of Law 
and allows the Houses of Congress to collectively appoint its own officers, so 
multimembers bodies were commonplace among agencies.125 
C.  Amtrak Is a Department Because it Is Independent of Other Agencies 
Amtrak is a Department for Appointments Clause purposes because it is 
independent within the Executive Branch and is not subject to substantial 
control by other departments.  Justice Alito’s main concern with labeling 
Amtrak as a Department was its subordinate status to another component of 
the Executive Branch.126  Justice Alito read the conditions outlined in 
PCAOB—freestanding component and lack of subordination—as necessary 
rather than sufficient, and cursorily determined that Amtrak was not a 
“Department.”127  However, even when reading the conditions as necessary, 
Justice Alito was incorrect on this issue.  First, Amtrak is formally not a part 
of any other government agency.  Second, Amtrak is not substantially 
controlled by another government agency.  Thus, Amtrak is a Department 
whose multimember board may appoint inferior officers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 122 Id. at 512 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 123 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 124 Id. at 512–13 (emphasizing the textual support that the Constitution lends to this proposition). 
 125 Id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; id. § 3, cl. 5; id. art II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 126 See Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1240 (2015) (“A ‘Department’ may not 
be ‘subordinate to or contained within any other such component’ of the Executive Branch.” 
(quoting PCAOB, 561 U.S. at 511)). 
 127 See id. 
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1.  Amtrak is Formally Independent of Any Other Government Agency 
Formally, Amtrak is not a part of any other government agency.  The 
Department of Transportation houses eleven sub-departments, one of which 
is the Federal Railroad Administration (“FRA”).128  Amtrak is not considered 
one of the FRA’s subsidiaries and as a formal matter is totally divested from 
the FRA.  In the entire subchapter within the United States Code on the 
Department of Transportation, Amtrak is only mentioned once, and only to 
be included in a study to be done by the Secretary on the feasibility of 
constructing high speed ground transportation systems in the United States 
due in 1995.129  Rather, Amtrak exists by independent statutory 
authorization and exists in a  separate section of the United States Code from 
the Department of Transportation (“DOT”).130  This would suggest that 
Amtrak is a Department according to Justice Scalia and Chief Justice 
Roberts as a freestanding entity within the Executive Branch. 
2.  Amtrak is Not Controlled by Any Other Department 
Further, Amtrak is not controlled by any other department and operates 
independently of other Departments.  Justice Alito was concerned with 
Amtrak’s relation to other Departments, inferring that it may be 
“subordinate” to them.  It could be inferred that an executive department 
who has substantial control over another formally independent department, 
is superior to that department.  Namely, Justice Alito mentioned the DOT, 
the FRA, and the STB.  Below, I discuss the ties these agencies have to 
Amtrak and why Justice Alito’s fears that Amtrak is subordinate to these 
agencies are ultimately unfounded. 
Justice Alito discussed the DOT as potentially having control over 
Amtrak.  The Secretary of Transportation has a permanent seat on Amtrak’s 
board and holds a vote which could be a crucial tiebreaker to deciding certain 
matters, such as electing Amtrak’s President.131  Further, the Secretary of 
Transportation has statutory authority to exempt Amtrak from its mandate 
 
 128 Our Administrations, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., https://www.transportation.gov/administrations (last 
visited Jan. 11, 2019) (identifying the FRA as one of the eleven sub-department groups of the 
Department of Transportation). 
 129 49 U.S.C. § 309(d)(1)(C) (2012); id. § 309(d)(2)(K). 
 130 See Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-518, 84 Stat. 1327 (financing and creating 
a “national rail passenger system”); see also 49 U.S.C. § 24301 (2008) (amended (2012)) (discussing 
Amtrak in a separate section of the United States Code concerning the DOT). 
 131 49 U.S.C. § 24302(a)(1)(A) (codifying the Secretary of Transportation as one of nine board 
directors); id. § 24303(a) (codifying that the President of Amtrak and its other officers are elected by 
the board of directors of Amtrak). 
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to buy articles, materials, and supplies mined, produced, or manufactured in 
the United States.132  The FRA has been executing and overseeing grants to 
Amtrak with congressional funds since its creation, providing $1.385 billion 
alone in 2016.133  Amtrak’s yearly expenses in 2016 were approximately $4.3 
billion, meaning that the federal government provides almost one third of 
Amtrak’s budget per year.134  This may suggest that the Secretary of 
Transportation and the FRA have substantial control over Amtrak and its 
activities.  This would speak directly to Justice Alito’s concerns that Amtrak is 
“subordinate to” another part of the Executive Branch.135  This concern is 
ultimately unsupported.  Amtrak has eight board members that are appointed 
independent of the DOT to counter the Secretary of Transportation that sits 
on the board.  The FRA executes and oversees grants to Amtrak by the grace 
of Congress who appropriates the funds in the first place.  The FRA’s grants 
to Amtrak do not operate like federal grants to states, that is to say, on a 
conditional basis.  They are simply a mechanism for Amtrak to receive the 
funds that Congress intended them to have. 
Justice Alito’s concurrence also mentioned Amtrak’s relationship to the 
STB.  In a passing comment, he wrote that Amtrak may be subordinate to 
the STB because in “jointly creating metrics and standards” with the FRA, 
it may have to defer to an arbitrator appointed by the STB.136  He also 
suggested that the STB itself may be part of the DOT, further implying that 
Amtrak is within that Department.137  While it is possible that at the time of 
writing a court would have held the view that the STB is a part of the DOT, 
Congress seems to have anticipated this problem and avoided it in December 
2015, around the same time it instituted the changes to Amtrak’s corporate 
board.138  In its changes, the STB was moved out of the subchapter of 
“Department of Transportation” in the United States Code to “Other 
Government Agencies.”139  The board members of the STB are all appointed 
 
 132 49 U.S.C. § 24305(f)(4) (codifying an exemption for Amtrak from having to comply with this 
statutory mandate). 
 133 Federal Grants to Amtrak, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP.: FED. R.R. ADMIN., 
https://www.fra.dot.gov/Page/P0249 (last visited Oct. 12, 2018). 
 134 National Fact Sheet FY 2016, AMTRAK, https://www.amtrak.com/content/dam/projects/dotcom/ 
english/public/documents/corporate/nationalfactsheets/National-Fact-Sheet-FY2016-0717.pdf.  
 135 Dep’t of Transp., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1240 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted) (discussing whether 
“Amtrak is ‘subordinate to’ the STB”). 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 See generally Surface Transportation Board Reauthorization Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-110, 129 
Stat. 2228 (describing the purpose of the Act as “establish[ing] the Surface Transportation Board 
as an independent establishment”). 
139 49 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2012) (establishing the STB within the DOT); 49 U.S.C. § 1301(a) (2015) 
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by the President and confirmed by the Senate, implying that they are all 
independently principal officers.140  Further, the statutory language was 
changed from “[t]here is hereby established within the Department of 
Transportation the Surface Transportation Board” to “[t]he Surface 
Transportation Board is an independent establishment of the United States 
Government.”141  Although statutory language is not dispositive of the 
matter, there seems to be no current link between the STB to the DOT.  
Further, it would be logically inconsistent to classify Amtrak as subordinate 
to the STB if we were not willing to classify the FRA as subordinate to the 
STB, since the FRA is a partner with Amtrak in creating the metrics and 
standards.  The FRA is a sub-department of the DOT, so classifying it under 
the STB would either imply that the entirety of the DOT was subordinate to 
the STB or would say that two departments can be superior to a sub-
department, which would only complicate the aim of separation of powers 
even further.  As a practical matter, devising the “metrics and standards” in 
conjunction with the FRA is one small part of what Amtrak does and is 
responsible for doing.  If its requirement to defer to the STB for these matters 
indicates that it is subordinate to the STB, it would complicate all matters of 
inter-agency collaboration.142 
Because Amtrak is for the most part independent from all other 
Departments of government and its board is directly accountable to the 
President of the United States, it should be considered a Department and its 
multimember board its Head for Appointments Clause purposes. 
CONCLUSION 
Had Congress not been so quick to act with the aptly named FAST Act, 
Amtrak may have been vulnerable to any entity who had a claim against its 
regulatory power.  In 2015, its President had voting power on the board and 
was not appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.  However, 
there should be little cause for concern as amended.  The President of 
Amtrak currently does not have voting power and is subject to the direct 
control of principal officers, which comfortably places him in the status of at 
 
(establishing the STB as an “independent establishment of the United States Government”). 
140 49 U.S.C. § 1301(b)(1) (establishing the power to appoint members to the board of Amtrak rests 
with the President of the United States). 
141 See generally 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (noting the amendment instituted in 2015). 
142 See Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 
1173 n.199 (2012) (describing the current practice of the Financial Stability Oversight Counsel in 
overseeing disputes between independent regulatory agencies). 
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least inferior officer.  As an inferior officer, he can be appointed by a Head 
of Department.  Amtrak is a Department because it is an agency independent 
of any other Department of the United States.  The voting members of its 
multimember board are its Head who have the power to appoint their own 
inferior officers. 
In SEC v. Lucia, a new trial was ordered because ALJs were considered 
inferior officers but were not appointed by the SEC board-members.143  Due 
to Congress’s actions, the next time a disgruntled regulated party has a 
problem with an Amtrak policy or regulation, it will have one fewer 
argument to use in court.  The President of Amtrak can sleep well knowing 
his job is safe. 
 
 
143 Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2055 (2018). 
